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NEW NIP IN THE BUD: DOES THE OBAMA BOARD'S PREEMPTIVE
STRIKE DOCTRINE ENHANCE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT LAW
STRATEGIES?
Michael C. Duff*
INTRODUCTION
Some scholars – justifiably skeptical of the potential of labor law for improving the
employment conditions of working Americans – have suggested the use of employment law as a
kind of substitute labor law.1 The claim is that “Workers . . . are relying on employment statutes,
not only for the traditional purpose of securing the substantive rights provided by those laws, but
also as the legal architecture that facilitates their organizational and collective activity — a legal
architecture we conventionally call labor law.”2 While I agree that employment law has been
used in this manner, I doubt the tactic's ultimate efficacy because, as a statistical matter - and as
sophisticated employers probably know - most employment law claims fail. 3 The recent courtimposed limitations on the ability of employment lawyers to take on class action litigation calls
into profound question the future of employment claims. 4 In addition, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) has held that union assistance with worker-filed employment law
claims is illegal once the union has filed an election petition to formally recognize workers
involved in the claims. 5 Unions, as a practical matter, may not involve themselves in any case in
which they have plans to file an NLRB petition for election.6 Regardless of petitioning intention,
any organizing campaign built around cases destined to fail seems unlikely to meet with success.
While workers' excitement may occur over the initiation of legal action, their enthusiasm cannot
help but be deflated by subsequent unhappy developments in a given case. Finally, there is little
collective ethic in the pursuit of individually grounded employment claims, a theme I will
address in a later section. 7 Labor law is still relevant for addressing individual worker claims in
a manner that allows for future collective action initiatives.
Nevertheless, it is easy to agree that informing workers of apparent violations of employment
law can galvanize them in the early stages of a protest movement, before one can conceive of
such inchoate general unrest as a coherent union organizing drive. In a similar manner, an
agitated worker could become sufficiently aggrieved to file a charge or complaint with an
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West Chester University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
1
Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008).
2
Id. at 2687
3
Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004).
4
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011) (Requiring at class certification stage “significant
proof” that an employer “operated under a general policy of discrimination.”)
5
Stericycle, 357 NLRB No. 61 (2011) (finding union filing of lawsuits after filing of election petitions objectionable
conduct
under conferral of benefits theory).
6
I realize that many unions have been choosing for the last two decades not to follow the NLRB election route. But
in FY 2009 2,696 representations petitions resulting in the conduct of secret-ballot elections were filed in NLRB
regional offices. Obviously some petitioners remain persuaded of benefits arising from government-certified
collective bargaining relationships; it seems a questionable tactic therefore to take the possibility of certification off
the table.
7
See infra. Part IV.
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employment law enforcement agency. If an employer becomes aware of the worker’s complaint,
it is easy to imagine the employer taking retaliatory adverse action against the worker. And, if
any of the complaining can be couched as a violation of the National Labor Relations Act, union
organizers will have the advantage of a low cost — from the organizers’ point of view —
workplace investigation that is likely to gain the notice of rank and file workers.8
In individual worker, enforcement agency complaint scenarios — especially with no union
involvement in a workplace — the NLRB has wrestled with the seemingly straightforward
question of whether an individual worker pursuing such a claim does so solely on the worker’s
own behalf, an activity that would traditionally not be protected by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), or is somehow acting on behalf of an entire insurgent work group, an activity that
may be protected under the NLRA.9 The question is easy to answer when there is unambiguous
evidence of concerted worker activity leading up to the individual complaint — for example
where all workers in a work group explicitly designate a co-worker to individually raise a claim
known by the employer to be brought on behalf of the entire group. But in the absence of such
evidence the issue is much more nuanced because the answer has seemed to hinge on whether all
workers are somehow derivatively complaining, so as to render the complaint “concerted” and
therefore falling under the protection of the NLRA.10
In this essay I will argue that the NLRB is authorized to remedy certain discharges of
individual workers who have not engaged in concerted activity, building on an idea that
Professor Charles Morris developed in an exhaustive article analyzing pre-organizational worker
activity published in the late 1980s11: Section 7 of the NLRA protects more than workers’ actual
concerted activities; it also protects the right of workers to act in concert.12 Predecessor statutory
language contained in Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), and
identical in many respects to the language of Section 7 of the NLRA, stated that employees had
“the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,”
which tracks the language of Section 7 of the NLRA; but that they merely “shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .” 13 The NLRA promoted the
ambiguous shall be free from language of the NIRA to a full-fledged “right . . . to engage in
8

I will address in more detail possible additional benefits of NLRB investigation in Part IV.
Cf. Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882 (1986) (Meyers II) (holding that workers individually filing non-NLRB
employment law claim were not engaging in “constructive concerted activity” protected by the NLRA) with Alleluia
Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975)(reaching opposite result).
10
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states:
9

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphases supplied)
11

Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7
Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673 (1988) [hereinafter Morris, Glimpse at a General Theory]
12
Morris, Glimpse at a General Theory at 1679.
13
Id.
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other concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection . . .”14 With Professor Morris, 15 I
view this as a critical addition to the statutory language.
The “Obama Board’s”16 recent decision in Parexel International (Parexel) may significantly
impact the manner in which the NLRB and the courts analyze such cases. 17 Previously, a
threshold question to be considered in government agency complaint cases was whether the
worker was in fact acting in concert with, or on the express or implied authorization of, other
workers.18 But the NLRB in Parexel appeared to ask a different question in assessing whether
an employer’s discharge of a worker violated the NLRA: did the adverse action violate the Act
because the employer anticipated that the worker would engage in protected concerted activity at
some time in the future and thereby intend to suppress the possibility of that activity? 19
Answering the question in the affirmative, the NLRB said:
If an employer acts to prevent concerted protected activity—to “nip it in the
bud”—that action interferes with and restrains the exercise of Section 7 rights and
is unlawful without more. That conclusion is supported not only by the plain text
of Section 8(a)(1), by the policies underlying Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) , , , but it is
consistent with other lines of Board precedent holding that, under certain
circumstances, employees who have engaged in no concerted activity at all are
protected from adverse action. For example, an adverse action taken against an
employee based on the employer's belief that the employee engaged in protected
concerted activity is unlawful even if the belief was mistaken and the employee
did not in fact engage in such activity. Similarly, a mass discharge undertaken
without concern for whether individual employees were engaged in concerted
activity – where “some white sheep suffer along with the black” – violates the
Act. What is critical in those cases is not what the employee did, but rather the
employer's intent to suppress protected concerted activity. So here . . .[The
worker's] discharge had the obvious effect of restricting her own further protected
discussions of wages and possible discrimination with other employees, thus
interfering with her Section 7 rights . . . [T]he discharge also had the effect of
keeping other employees in the dark about these matters, thus preventing them
from discussing, and possibly inquiring further or acting in response to,
substandard wages or perceived wage discrimination.20
Though Parexel did not involve a worker’s complaint to a government agency, it did address
the nature of concert, which has been the analytical sticking point for “outside agency
complaint” cases. The NLRB’s analysis in Parexel presents an opportunity to think more deeply
14

See supra. n.9 for NLRA statutory language.
Id.
16
That is, the most recent version of the National Labor Relations Board in which three of the five members were
appointed by President Obama. By recent tradition, presidents have appointed members in this 3:2 ratio in
presumptive favor of the presidents' parties interests.
17
356 NLRB No. 82 (2011)
18
See N.L.R.B. v. Portland Airport Limousine Co., 163 F.3d 662 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding no protected concerted
activity because the involved worker was not seeking to initiate, induce or prepare for group action).
19
Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 5 (“The Respondent sought to erect “a dam at the source of
supply” of potential, protected activity.”) (Emphases supplied).
20
Id.
15
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about why, in light of the dismal and worsening track record of employment law plaintiffs, 21
employers would bother to discharge individual workers seeking redress from government
employment law enforcement agencies. Perhaps in the normal course of events the employer is
merely angry with the worker for questioning its authority — a motive for which the law offers
little if any redress. Maybe the employer is concerned that other workers may become aware of
the lone worker standing up to its authority, and fears that this spirit of resistance may spread.
This motive brings consequences, for the NLRB has consistently held that conduct that would
reasonably tend to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights violates the NLRA.22
Thus, reasonable inferences drawn from the facts of a given case may show that an employer's
discharge of a lone worker was intended to send a broader message to the work group as a
whole: try to obtain help - any help from any quarter - and you will be discharged.23 Further,
can there be reasonable doubt that a worker willing to approach a governmental agency, without
co-worker support, is precisely the kind of worker who would make initial overtures to a union?
Regardless, it seems hard to argue that this kind of discharge — with or without unlawful intent
— would not chill or suppress future attempts by the involved work group (and perhaps workers
in other work groups learning of the action) to engage in the concerted activity that is protected
under the NLRA.24
I first address the facts of Parexel in Part I of this essay. In Part II, I explain how Parexel
departs from the reasoning of NLRB decisions limiting the application of the National Labor
Relations Act to cases in which workers were acting with or on the authority of other workers,
implicitly or explicitly. I defend Parexel’s outcome in Part III, but on a different theory than the
one relied on by the NLRB, which drew for support on cases like Monarch Water Systems25and
Phelps Dodge Corp v. N.L.R.B.26 I will argue that while Parexel's majority in reality borrows
substantially in spirit from anti-union discrimination cases like Darlington Manufacturing27 and
George Lithograph,28 Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, properly interpreted,
is more than equal to the task of protecting workers victimized by nip-in-the-bud discharges,
even where the workers have not yet engaged in either union activity or non-union "concerted"
activity. 29 In Part IV, I explain how an expanded 8(a)(1) rationale in support of the outcome in
Parexel — rather than a borrowed anti-union rubric30 — might strengthen “employment law as
labor law” strategies.
21

Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to
Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009)
22
Unbelievable, Inc., 323 NLRB 815, 816 (1997) ("Under well-established Board law, an employer violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act if its conduct may reasonably be said to have a tendency to interfere with the free exercise of
employee rights.")
23
See Alleluia Cushion, 221 NLRB 995, 1000 (1975) (discharge of individual worker one day after OSHA had
inspected the workplace “would indicate to the other employees the danger of seeking assistance from Federal or
state agencies in order to obtain their statutorily guaranteed working conditions.”)
24
See e.g. Crown Stationers, 272 NLRB 164 (1984) (finding violation of Section 8(a)(1) where workers stumbled
upon threatening letter written by employer's principal that was never intended to be disclosed to workers but would
reasonably have tended to chill workers in the exercise of Section 7 rights).
25
271 NLRB 558 (1984)
26
313 U.S. 177 (1941)
27
Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965)
28
George Lithograph Company, 204 NLRB 431 (1973)
29
The text of Section 7 of the NLRA, see supra., n.9, renders this proposition problematic.
30
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA states in relevant part, “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . . .”
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I. THE FACTS OF PAREXEL
In Parexel the employer performed research studies for pharmaceutical companies at its
Baltimore, Maryland facility and employed a number of people from South Africa. 31 The
discharged worker, a licensed practical nurse, was not from South Africa.32 On a date in 2006,
the worker had a discussion with a co-worker, who was from South Africa.33 The South African
co-worker had ceased working for the employer a month or so earlier but had recently returned
to employment for reasons that were not clear. During the discussion the South African coworker claimed, falsely, that he had received a raise upon his return, that he had been promoted
to shift-supervisor, and that his wife, also a South African and who had also recently left
employment with the employer, would also be returning to employment with a raise.34 Two
other employees were in the area of the discussion at the time but did not participate in it.35 The
South African co-worker, in fabricating his nonexistent good fortune, and that of his wife,
explained to the non-South African worker, “. . . we're clever people and . . . [Manager of
Clinical Operations Liz Jones, also a South African] is going to look after us.”36 The NLRB ALJ
found as fact that by “us” the South African co-worker meant all South Africans working for the
employer.37
A day or two later, the worker told her immediate supervisor about her conversation with the
South African co-worker.38 The worker said “that she thought the whole unit should quit and
come back with a raise.”39 She also told her supervisor “that all the South Africans socialized
together and that Liz Jones was going to look after them.” 40 The worker’s supervisor then
informed Jones of the worker’s comments.41 Shortly thereafter, Jones and a human resources
consultant summoned the worker to discuss her conversation with the South African coworker.42 Jones and the human resources consultant “were concerned about a ‘rumor,’ which
they believed originated with the worker, that South African employees were receiving favored
treatment and ‘taking over.’”43 The worker recounted the substance of her discussion with the
South African co-worker and opined that the employer “was paying South Africans higher wages
and that Jones was going to continue favoring the South Africans in that manner.”44 Jones then
asked the worker if she had discussed her conversation with the South African co-worker with
anyone other than her immediate supervisor.45 When the worker confirmed that she had not, the
employer discharged her, about a week later.46
31

Id. at 1.
Id.
33
Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 1.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 1
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 1.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 2
44
Id.
45
Parexel International, 356 NLRB No. 82, slip op. at 1.
46
Id.
32
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The Administrative Law Judge hearing the case, Arthur Amchan, was understandably
hesitant to find a violation of the NLRA on the facts before him. The Judge stated,
In some respects, Neuschafer's termination was a preemptive strike to prevent her
from engaging in activity protected by the Act . . . However, I have not
encountered any precedent for the proposition that I can find a violation on this
basis without evidence that the alleged discriminatee had in fact engaged in
concerted protected activity. Therefore, I decline to affirm the complaint on this
basis.47
The Judge’s hesitation was understandable because the Board had decided no case that he could
cite holding that a “preemptive strike,” nip-in-the-bud discharge, in the absence of activity the
involved employer knew or at least suspected (even if erroneously) to be either concerted or
union-affiliated, violated the NLRA.48 In the next section, I will develop how the Board might
have been expected to decide Parexel under traditional Board law. In short, it would have
summarily upheld Judge Amchan.
II.

EVALUATION OF PAREXEL UNDER A “TRADITIONAL”
CONCERTED ACTIVITY ANALYSIS

In this Part, I will first discuss how the Board has traditionally handled nip-in-the-bud
discharges. No significant precedent exists for application of a nip-in-the-bud or preemptive
strike theory in non-union contexts in which an employer did not at least believe that an
individual worker was already engaged in activity with or on the authority of other workers.
Next, I will discuss attempts by the NLRB to broaden protection of individual workers under the
NLRA on a “constructive concerted activity” theory. I will then recount the NLRB's subsequent
rejection of the constructive concerted activity theory. In the wake of that rejection, one might
47

Id. slip op. at 16
There was another route by which the ALJ might have found a violation, however. The judge might simply have
concluded that the worker was discharged as a result of her original conversation with the apparently fibbing South
African co-worker, see supra n.30 and accompanying text, which was in itself concerted activity. See Morris,
Glimpse at a General Theory at 1728-29 (discussing the dissenting opinion in Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 NLRB 1313
(1951)). Though it might be argued that the conversation did not have as its purpose preparation for group action
and was therefore not concerted within the meaning of the NLRA,
48

T]he finding of concertedness, or the right to engage in concerted conduct, surely cannot be based
on the employee's own perception of purpose. An employee may have no clear perception of her
intent when she first engages in a discussion with a fellow employee about a condition of
employment. Clear intent may not develop until after that discussion, or it may never develop. Nor
should it be the function of the Board to find her intent, whether a “personal” one as the majority
found, or a “concerted” one as the dissent found. If “equality” between employee and employer
means anything at all at the pre-organizational stage of Section 7, it means that employees cannot
be prohibited from engaging in discussions about their conditions of employment, unless there is a
showing of legitimate businesses justification.
Morris, Glimpse at a General Theory at 1729
Equality of bargaining power is one of the fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §
151.
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have predicted that the NLRB would summarily uphold Judge Amchan's dismissal of the
complaint in Parexel, but it did not.
A.

Prior Board Protection of Workers from Nip-In-The-Bud Actions in Union or
Inferable Concerted Activity Contexts

Generally speaking Board law protects workers discharged to prevent them from exercising
rights under the NLRA. 49 NLRB law has consistently protected the early stages of union
organizing activity from nip-in-the-bud actions50 — typically employer discharges of known or
suspected union adherents. This protection is one of the bases upon which the NLRB will, under
Section 10(j) of the NLRA, seek injunctive relief from a federal district court to reestablish the
status quo ante pending an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the underlying administrative
case.51 Nevertheless, the parameters of NLRA coverage must be scrutinized to fully understand
the nature of this protection.
In the common nip in the bud case, 52 the requisite precursors for NLRA coverage —that
worker activity be both “protected” and “concerted”— will have been met as a matter of law
upon finding that 1) a worker has become affiliated with a union, activity explicitly protected
under Section 7 of the NLRA, and 2) the worker suffered adverse action because his or her
employer knew or suspected the union affiliation. The underlying activity is presumptively
concerted even if undertaken by a lone worker.53 Moreover, in cases in which union activity of
any kind is involved, an employer’s adverse action based on mere suspicion of a worker’s
complicity in the activity is sufficient to violate the NLRA, assuming the employer is unable to
establish that the worker would have suffered the same fate in the absence of the union activity.54
Outside of the union context, however, the situation becomes more complicated because worker
activity is not as obviously protected or concerted. In non-union contexts worker activity may be
unprotected altogether, or it may be protected but not concerted. As Professors Gorman and
Finkin effectively summarized the rule decades ago,
The prevailing principle of law — endorsed both by the courts of appeals and the
49

N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983) (“. . . it is undisputed that if the
employer fires an employee for having engaged in union activities and has no other basis for the discharge, or if the
reasons that he proffers are pretextual, the employer commits an unfair labor practice.”). The remedy for such a
discharge is reinstatement and backpay subject to ordinary mitigation principles.
50
See e.g. Atlantic Veal & Lamb, 342 NLRB 418, 426 (2004) (noting that the NLRB’s general counsel characterized
the employer’s discharge of workers in the early stages of an organizational campaign as “nip in the bud tactics”)
51
“Section 10(j) [injunctive] proceedings are authorized to prevent the irreparable destruction of a union's nascent
organizational campaign . . . Such violations virtually ‘nip in the bud’ the union's campaign or clearly threaten to do
so if not immediately enjoined.” NLRB ELECTRONIC REDACTED SECTION 10(J) MANUAL USER’S GUIDE available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/44/redacted_10j_manual_5.0_reduced.pdf.
52
By common I mean simply that a worker known or suspected to be a union adherent is fired to prevent union
organizing at the employer's establishment.
53
TNT Logistics, 340 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1186, n.1 (2003) (“[D]espite the fact that other employees did not directly
engage in any organizational activity, Morgan nonetheless engaged in protected concerted activity by sharing the
contents of his letter [expressing interest in having a union represent employees] to management. . .”) I do not mean
to suggest that it would be impossible for an individual worker in a unionized workplace to engage in protected
activity deemed not to be concerted as a matter of law.
54
Atlantic Veal & Lamb, supra. 342 NLRB at 419-20 (finding sufficient evidence to support finding that employer
at least suspected discharged worker's involvement with union in nip in the bud circumstances.)
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NLRB — is that section 7 does not protect “personal gripes” by individual
employees. If an individual complains to management about working conditions
affecting him alone, this will be treated as individual rather than concerted
activity, and the employee will not be protected against discharge.55
In either eventuality — the absence of protected or concerted activity — the conduct may fall
outside the scope and protection of Section 7.
Prior NLRB law protects unambiguously concerted protests of favoritism in the workplace,
real or perceived, provided the subject of protest has its nexus in terms and conditions of
employment.56 Thus, if the worker in Parexel had obviously joined other workers to complain
about alleged work-related preferential treatment of South African co-workers, the explicitly
joint complaint would have been protected unless the employer was able to establish that it had a
“non-NLRA” reason for taking adverse action against the worker.57 The difficulty in Parexel
arises precisely because the worker did not discuss her complaint with coworkers before
complaining herself, 58 nor did she express to her employer an intention of discussing in the
future the South African policy with co-workers. Rather, the evidence suggested strongly that
her employer baldly anticipated she would engage in such discussions, and took steps to prevent
it from happening. 59 In other words, the employer nipped the situation in the bud in the same
way that an employer might nip a union organizing drive in the bud by firing a suspected union
adherent in the very early stages of a union organizing drive.
The problem for the NLRB is that the union organizing drive analogy is imperfect. While
the in futuro, nip-in-the bud impact is arguably parallel in both union and non-union workplace
scenarios, the decided “suspicion” cases are premised on some known link to union activity that
is independently protected by the NLRA.60 For example, assume that an employer discharges a
worker because the worker's relative is a known union adherent at another establishment, and the
employer therefore suspects the worker will instigate union activity at its establishment. 61
Settled authority holds this motive for discharging the worker to be unlawful even though the

55

Robert A. Gorman and Matthew W. Finkin, Individual and the Requirement of Concert Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 290 (1981) [hereinafter Gorman & Finkin, Individual and the Requirement of
Concert]
56
North Carolina License Plate, 346 NLRB 293 (2006) (finding violation in connection with discharges carried out
after workers alleged workplace favoritism and threatened to complain to employer’s contractor, the state
Department of Motor Vehicles).
57
Id.; see also Needell & McGlone, 311 NLRB 455 (1993) (finding the complaints of a lone worker regarding the
employer’s alleged preferential treatment of a co-worker protected because the lone worker had previously
discussed the situation with other co-workers and her subsequent lone complaint to employer was therefore the
“logical outgrowth” of group activity). The logical outgrowth test was famously endorsed by the Third Circuit in
Mushroom Transportation, 330 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir. 1964), which remains the lead case for the proposition.
58
Parexel International, 356 N.L.R.B. No. 82, slip op. at 15
59
Id. at 16
60
Section 8(a)(3) states in relevant part that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization . . .” Thus, an employer taking action against a lone worker for
anti-union reasons violates the NLRA.
61
Martech MDI, 331 N.L.R.B. 487, 488 (2000) (finding violation where employer admitted that employee "was
selected for lay off because she was part of a group of employees [including her sister] of whom he had personal
knowledge.")
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discharged worker was not actually involved in union activity. 62 If, however, even in a union
context case,63 a discharged worker engages in no union activity, and there is no evidence as to
why the employer would have suspected union activity of the worker, a prima facie violation of
the NLRA could not be made out. 64 On the other hand, if the employer admitted that it
discharged a worker whom it believed had not yet engaged in union activity, but whom it
believed — assume for unspecified reasons — might in the future engage in such activity, the
hypothetical case would resemble Parexel, if Parexel had arisen in a unionized context, and
would make out a violation of the NLRA. 65
Although these rules have essentially been in place for decades, the implications flowing
from them can still lead to controversy or criticism even in a unionized context. To take a recent
example, a unionized employer’s anticipation of the exercise of protected activity by its
unionized workers was at the center of the recent Boeing controversy, a case that settled as I was
writing portions of this piece.66 In Boeing, the employer essentially admitted it was relocating its
facility from Washington state to South Carolina at least partly because it feared its Washingtonbased unionized employees, who had struck in the past, and might similarly engage in a strike in
the future.67 The popular discussion of the matter reflected a widespread misunderstanding that
the legal issue in the ensuing NLRB case was whether the employer could lawfully relocate.68 In
reality, the case concerned in substantial measure the lawfulness of an employer’s
communication to unionized workers that it was relocating certain manufacturing work because
it anticipated the workers' exercise of NLRA protected union activity in the future,69 which was
in some respects similar to the anticipatory situation in Parexel, although Boeing arose in a
unionized context.
Because the facts in Parexel seemed to establish that the worker had not engaged in (and had
no future intention of engaging in) discussions with co-workers of the alleged favoritism, the
case bears resemblance to earlier non-union context cases in which employers mistakenly
assumed that workers had been engaging in concerted activity. For example, in JCR Hotel a
non-union employer fired a worker whom it mistakenly believed was about to lead co-workers
62

See e.g.. Permanent Label Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 118, 136 (1980); N.L.R.B. v. Clinton Packing Co., 468 F.2d 953,
955 (8th Cir. 1972); N.L.R.B. v. Ritchie Manufacturing, 354 F.2d 90, 98 (8th Cir. 1965);
63
By “union context” I mean simply a case in which a union is somehow engaged in attempts to organize workers at
a particular workplace.
64
See e.g. Amcast Automotive of Indiana, 348 NLRB 836 (2006) (finding that employer’s knowledge of worker’s
prior but temporally remote union activity insufficient to establish its knowledge or suspicion of worker’s present
union activity).
65
See e.g. Talladega Cotton Factory, 213 F.2d 209, 214 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1954) (upholding NLRB's reinstatement of
otherwise unprotected supervisors for refusing to engage in unfair labor practices because of the potential chilling
impact on the future exercise of workers' Section 7 rights);
66
Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After Union Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
December 10, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/labor-board-drops-case-againstboeing.html
67
See N.L.R.B. Complaint of General Counsel paragraph 6(a)-(e), April 20, 2011 [hereinafter GC's Boeing
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out on a strike.70 The Eighth Circuit upheld the NLRB’s conclusion that a discharge based solely
on the belief that a worker intended to engage in concerted activity, even where the belief was
erroneous or did not come to fruition, violated the NLRA. 71 JCR is distinguishable from Parexel,
however, because in JCR the employer was aware of work-related discussions between the
discharged worker and co-workers – discussions the discharged worker claimed to be merely
jocular – before taking adverse action.72
Closer to Parexel, in terms of the absence of preliminary worker discussions in a non-union
setting, is the NLRB's decision in Monarch Water Systems, 73 a case the Parexel Board cited with
approval.74 In Monarch, the NLRB found that an employer discharged a non-union worker who
had participated in a Department of Labor compliance investigation. 75 The Administrative Law
Judge hearing the case found that the discharge was motivated both by the individual worker’s
solo participation in an underlying DOL investigation, and by the employer’s president's belief
that the worker had joined with a co-worker in making complaints leading to the investigation.76
The Judge thought that the discharge was unlawful under either motivation. 77 The NLRB
declined to find that the worker’s solo outreach represented “constructive” concerted activity. 78
Instead, it found that the discharge violated the NLRA because it was based, at least in part, on
the president’s belief that the two co-workers had been responsible for causing the investigation,
in other words in his belief that the worker in question had actually been involved in concerted
activity. 79 In a footnote, the NLRB observed that there was no evidence in the record
establishing that the president was correct in this belief and emphasized that its accuracy was
irrelevant.80
Monarch did not explicitly deal with a nip in the bud scenario. The case was decided on a
theory of remedying retaliation for prior worker action rather than curing unlawful preemption of
future worker action.81 But it does hold that an employer’s retaliation premised on an erroneous
belief that a worker has previously engaged in concerted overtures to government agencies, even
outside of unionized contexts, may make out a violation of the NLRA. 82 Significantly, the
violation in Monarch was found in the absence of evidence of actual concerted activity. The
Board found that the employer was concerned about other workers talking to the worker
suspected of sparking the DOL investigation of company business, and that the employer knew
generally that the worker and at least one other co-worker were friends. 83 The employer
explicitly directed that co-worker “not to talk to” the worker responsible for the DOL
investigation. 84 Accordingly, a similarity exists between Monarch and Parexel because in each
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case actual concerted activity was absent; but, as I will discuss, 85 the two cases are critically
distinguishable.
The Parexel Board also cited Compuware Corp.,86 a non-union case in which an employer
discharged a worker to prevent him from speaking during a company meeting about work-related
complaints. 87 Certain state officials had been expected to attend the meeting. 88 Because the state
was a customer of the employer, the worker was attempting to exert heightened pressure in
support of the complaints by communicating directly with the customer-officials. Thus, the case
is similar to Parexel because in a non-union context the employer discharged a worker to
interfere with the future exercise of what would have been concerted activity. 89 In Section III, I
will explain90 why Compuware, like Monarch, does not quite fit the facts of Parexel.
In sum, the NLRB's authority to remedy nip-in-the-bud employer discharges outside of a
union or other obvious “concerted” context seems questionable based on existing precedent.91
Prior attempts by the NLRB to construct or supply the element of concert in any non-union
context have, moreover, met with significant resistance.92 For example, the protection of nonunion, individual worker solicitations of assistance from government workplace enforcement
agencies like the Department of Labor has been problematic. That kind of protection is, of
course, central to this essay’s argument that such outreach could strengthen employment law as
labor law initiatives.
NLRB adjudicators have at times argued that individual worker participation in workplace
agency enforcement processes is constructively concerted because it necessarily inures to the
benefit of the entire work group.93 At other times — and as generally insisted on by the circuit
courts94 — the NLRB has taken the position that the relevant statutory language will simply not
bear the “constructive” concerted activity theory outside of unionized contexts.95 I turn now to
that debate, both to illustrate the difficulties in articulating theories of “constructive concerted
activity,” and to demonstrate how the resistance to such theories has encouraged the NLRB to
often reflexively and prematurely dismiss charges not alleging the most explicit interference with
obvious concerted activity. My larger purpose is to explore whether the NLRB might
permissibly protect under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA facially individual overtures to various
85
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government enforcement agencies.
B.

Alleluia Cushion - Constructive Concerted Activity

In Alleluia Cushion,96 the NLRB reached for an expansive theory of concert. The attempt
was predictably rebuffed, and in my opinion the Board has never recovered. In that case, a
maintenance worker began complaining about safety conditions at his workplace soon after his
hire. 97 He objected to "the lack of instruction regarding chemicals used in production, the
absence of protective guards on machines, his inability to communicate safety instructions to the
majority of employees who were Spanish-speaking, and the absence of first aid stations, eyewash
stations, and an overall safety program."98 In response, the employer informed him that it did not
want to invest in safety at the individual plant in question because, it claimed, that plant would
soon be closing. 99 Soon thereafter the worker was transferred to another of the employer's
plants. 100 There, he claimed to have encountered a similar lack of safety and began again to
protest.101 Faced with alleged repeated failures to address his concerns, the worker wrote a letter
of complaint to the state “OSHA” office, and forwarded a copy of the letter to his employer.102
Prior to orally complaining to his employer about these most recent safety issues and writing the
letter to the OSHA office about the issues, the worker had not discussed the concerns with coworkers.103 Nor had he registered his complaints with the prior knowledge of co-workers.104
An operations manager soon thereafter reprimanded the worker for contacting the state
OSHA office “and stated that if so ordered by the home office [the worker] would have to be
fired.”105 Other supervisors allegedly informed the worker that a raise he had been promised was
cancelled to pay for the employer's unanticipated safety expenditures. 106 In his exchange of
correspondence with the state OSHA office, the worker learned that the employer had previously
been cited by the same agency for similar offenses and was already under an obligation to post
notice of the citations the agency had previously issued.107 When the worker questioned the
employer about these contentions the employer informed him that it did not intend to comply
with the posting requirement.108 A couple of weeks later, the employer fired the worker after he
accompanied a state OSHA inspector on a tour of the facility in order to point out the alleged
safety violations. 109
The Administrative Law Judge hearing the case found that the worker was motivated solely
by his own safety concerns in approaching the state OSHA.110 The judge focused on the lack of
evidence that the worker was engaged in concerted activity with co-workers or that the worker's
96
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approach to the agency was an outgrowth of concerted worker action.111 The judge found no
evidence of, and was unwilling to infer, that other workers were also concerned with workplace
safety. 112 The judge conceded, however, that the worker's conduct in approaching the agency
would have been protected if it had also been concerted.113 Finding no evidence of concerted
activity, the judge recommended the complaint be dismissed. 114
On review of the Judge's decision the NLRB majority acknowledged that the protesting
worker had acted alone in complaining to the state OSHA about the employer's alleged dearth of
safety precautions. 115 The NLRB argued, however, that
[T]he absence of any outward manifestation of support for [the worker's] efforts is
not, in our judgment, sufficient to establish that [the employer's] employees did
not share Henley's interest in safety or that they did not support his complaints
regarding the safety violations. Safe working conditions are matters of great and
continuing concern for all within the work force. Indeed, occupational safety is
one of the most important conditions of employment.116
Indeed, the NLRB majority argued that it should be presumed that other workers supported the
complaining lone worker in the absence of evidence that other workers had disavowed
representation by the worker. 117 This principle has become known as the Alleluia
presumption.118 The majority also argued that, because the federal and state governments had
been active in recent years passing a number of statutes mandating occupational safety, it would
be acting in a vacuum if it ignored these trends in the broader fabric of workplace law. The
Board's controversial conclusion was that,
Rather, since minimum safe and healthful employment conditions for the
protection and well-being of employees have been legislatively declared to be in
the overall public interest, the consent and concert of action emanates from the
mere assertion of such statutory rights. Accordingly, where an employee speaks
up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational safety
designed for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that
fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent
thereto and deem such activity to be concerted.
It came as no surprise to many observers that the decision was swiftly revisited by the “Reagan
Boards” and promptly reversed. 119
111
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C. Meyers Industries - Rejection of the Constructive Concerted Activity Theory in Non-Union
Workplaces
Not long after deciding the case, the NLRB reversed itself and rejected Alleluia Cushion's
expansive constructive concerted activity approach. In Meyers Industries, 120 an employer
assigned a truck driver to drive a truck and trailer hauling boats from the employer's
manufacturing facility in Michigan to boat dealers around the country. 121 The driver's truck
frequently malfunctioned - the brakes were especially unreliable – and he lodged multiple safety
complaints with the employer.122 A co-worker had previously experienced similar malfunctions
with the same equipment.123 Eventually, the employer made unsuccessful attempts to repair the
equipment.124 A few weeks later the driver was involved in an accident in Tennessee that he
claimed was caused by the truck's malfunctioning brakes. 125 Defying the employer's insistence
that the truck depart Tennessee expeditiously, notwithstanding the accident and the still bad
brakes, the driver instead had the truck inspected by the Tennessee Public Service
Commission. 126 The Commission cited the vehicle on multiple counts and forbade that it be
taken out on the road until the employer made repairs. 127 Thereafter, the trailer was sold for
scrap and the driver drove the truck back to Michigan. 128 Upon his return, the employer asked
the driver why he had not attempted to drive the truck and trailer back to Michigan instead of
contacting the authorities.129 The driver answered that he did not think it was safe to drive the
vehicle.130 The employer summarily fired him stating, “[W]e can't have you calling the cops like
this all the time.”131
Hearing these facts the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employer fired the
driver both because he had refused to drive an unsafe vehicle after filing a report with the
Tennessee Public Service Commission, and in retaliation for his earlier safety complaints.132 The
judge found a violation under Alleluia Cushion, a decision the judge thought “established a
presumption that an individual employee engages in concerted activity where his conduct arises
out of the employment relationship and is a matter of common concern among all employees.”133
The judge found that the driver, by contacting local authorities and refusing to drive the vehicle,
“was enforcing the cited provisions of the national transportation policy, and that his invoking
appointed during Reagan’s first term. The second Meyers case, see infra. II.E., was decided by the Board appointed
during Reagan’s second term.
120
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the Tennessee Public Service Commission's inspection apparatus was the legal equivalent of a
safety complaint to OSHA.” 134 The judge added that the employer was “free, under Alleluia
Cushion, to rebut the inference that [the employer's] activity inured to the benefit of all
employees.”135
The manner in which the NLRB dismissed the Administrative Law Judge's decision remains
revealing. First, the Meyers I Board alleged that Alleluia Cushion had dispensed with any
requirement that a finding of concert of action depended on objective manifestations of "group
will."136 Rather, claimed the majority, the Board in Alleluia Cushion had simply substituted its
views of what workers ought to be concerned about for what they were in fact concerned about
in a given workplace.137 In an especially scathing passage, the Meyers I Board next claimed that
Alleluia Cushion had simply “questioned whether the purpose of the activity was one it wished
to protect and, if so, it then deemed the activity ‘concerted,’ without regard to its form. This is
the essence of the per se standard of concerted activity.”138 In other words, Alleluia Cushion was
charged with imposing its worker-friendly view of the world on the regulated community rather
than with simply, but in good faith, having a wrong-headed view as to how to read statutory
provisions or regimes in pari materia.139
Perhaps predictably, on appeal the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
NLRB to explain its decision more fully. 140 One very large factor occasioning remand was surely
the Supreme Court's intervening decision in City Disposal, an opinion issuing in the same year
the Board decided Meyers I.141 In a critical passage in the D.C. Circuit’s remand opinion, Prill v.
N.L.R.B., Judge Harry T. Edwards argued that City Disposal “made clear that Section 7 does not
compel a narrowly literal interpretation of ‘concerted activities,’ but rather [it] is to be construed
by the Board in light of its expertise in labor relations.” 142 It is extremely important to my
present purpose to emphasize Judge Edwards observation that in Meyers I, “the Board failed
even to consider whether the discharge of an employee because of his safety complaints would
discourage other employees from engaging in collective activity to improve working
conditions.”143 That prescient comment reflects a deep understanding of workplace reality — the
shock and awe attendant to the immediate discharge of an individual worker for general
employment rights invocation obviously would tend to chill assertion of Section 7 rights. As an
administrative law matter, the NLRB would be entitled in any event to find that it did. 144
I next digress to discuss City Disposal itself and follow the digression by a return to the
Meyers controversy to reflect on the Board’s decision on remand in Meyers II.
D. City Disposal - Acceptance of the Constructive Concerted Activity Theory in Union
Workplaces
134
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City Disposal was a landmark Supreme Court case in which the Court’s majority approved
the NLRB's constructive concerted Interboro Doctrine in workplaces governed by collective
bargaining agreements.145 City Disposal established that in some instances individual conduct
was indeed protected by the NLRA where it was the outgrowth of a preexisting and obvious
collective bargaining process.146 While I will not here delve deeply into the facts of the case, it is
enough to say that a lone worker complained about having to operate an unsafe truck and was
discharged as a result. 147 What distinguished this unsafe truck case from the unsafe truck
scenario in Meyers was the existence of a unionized work group and a collective bargaining
agreement governing the workplace. 148 The worker in City Disposal, though asserting the
individual “right” of not being required to drive an unsafe truck, could be said to be invoking the
grievance arbitration machinery of a collective bargaining agreement that was itself the product
of concerted action. 149
The concept of group creation of a right that necessarily may only be individually enforced
or asserted — which is how the Court characterized the collective bargaining workplace150 —
continues to have potentially sweeping ramifications. After all, it would be difficult to locate a
workplace statute that was not in substantial measure influenced by organized labor's political
lobbying.151 At a minimum, to the extent the NLRB felt at liberty to assume that individual
conduct could never be protected by the NLRA as a matter of law, City Disposal negated the
assumption. The decision has subsequently been narrowly applied to unionized workplaces,
however, and the Meyers II decision has remained the reflexive presumption in the non-union
workplace. Nevertheless, City Disposal gave the Meyers II Board cause for repose.
One extremely underappreciated fact in City Disposal is that the aggrieved worker, Brown,
never got to the point of “formally” filing a grievance prior to his discharge. 152 The Court
145
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forgave this omission, but it is worth mulling over why it did so, for even if grievance filing
activity can be conceived as an outgrowth of the concerted collective bargaining process, pregrievance activity is a degree farther removed from the concrete contractual manifestation of that
process. The Court, while asserting that “at some point an individual employee's actions may
become so remotely related to the activities of fellow employees that it cannot reasonably be said
that the employee is engaged in concerted activity,”153 fails to explain why an individual worker
raising an extemporaneous complaint, but not filing a grievance or referring to the collective
bargaining agreement, is engaging in concerted activity. I think the answer is that allowance of
discharge by employers in such circumstances would represent a failure to recognize how
grievances become grievances. Shutting off workplace complaints in the hazy “pre-grievance”
stage would almost certainly chill the filing of formal grievances. Furthermore, it is precisely the
initial impulse of resistance that might culminate in the more recognizable concerted activity that
the policy of the law claims it wishes to protect. And if shutting off initial impulses of resistance
could stifle collective activity in a unionized workplace, it is hard to explain why the same
preliminary suppression would not operate in a similar manner in a non-union workplace, and
why the conduct would not therefore be subject to NLRB regulation. It is a most curious policy.
In the words of Judge Harry T. Edwards,
Moreover, the Board's decision in Meyers[I] produces the anomaly that a
unionized worker who complains about safety or other matters covered by a
collective bargaining agreement will be held protected under Interboro and City
Disposal, while an unorganized employee will be denied protection for engaging
in identical conduct. We agree with the Board that its responsibility is to apply the
National Labor Relations Act and not to enforce all state and federal law. This
does not mean, however, that with respect to matters within its discretion, the
Board should ignore the policy implications of its decisions. 154
On those parting words the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB.
E.

Distinguishing Meyers II from Meyers I

The point of departure of Meyers II was that the NLRB was now required to acquiesce to the
D.C. Circuit’s view that Meyers I represented only one possible interpretation of the meaning of
“concerted activity.” In effect, the NLRB was bound by the view made inescapable after City
Disposal: that concerted activity could be found as a matter of law when a lone worker intends to
induce group activity, acts as a representative of at least one other worker, or asserts rights rooted
in a collective bargaining agreement.155 Even more expansively, the NLRB was all but invited to
articulate its preferred view of the outer boundary of concerted activity. 156 As the Prill dissent
understood perfectly, 157 implicit in the rejection of Meyers I was the possibility that Alleluia
153
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Cushion represented a permissible reading of Section 7.158
Understood in that context Meyers II is properly read as a policy justification for the
narrowest possible reading open to the NLRB following City Disposal — i.e., the slight nudges
of the envelope that the circuit courts had allowed up to that time.159 The NLRB would go no
further. As Professor Morris has observed,
Meyers II failed to recognize the true relationship between activity for mutual aid
or protection and group action, because it failed to see that the former is but a
prelude to group action, and, therefore, entitled to protection as part of the right to
engage in such action. The Board even “freely acknowledged that efforts to
invoke the protection of statutes benefiting employees are efforts engaged in for
the purpose of ‘mutual aid of protection,’” but it failed to make the logical
connection between such activity and the benefit other employees would receive.
Instead of addressing the presumption created by Alleluia, it set up two other
possibilities as straw men: “either . . . to indulge in a presumption that all statutes
that benefit employees are the product of concerted employee activity or . . . to
make factual inquiries into who had worked for passage of the law in question.160
Thus, there was little recognition of a pre-organizational workplace reality in which it is the
initial individual impulse to resistance possessing the potential to culminate in concerted activity.
Meyers II essentially authorized the stamping out of pre-organizational activity in its earliest
possible glimmerings. While Judge Bork’s dissent in Prill I dismisses such a lament as nonacceptance of statutory limitations, Justice Brennan’s City Disposal opinion is in my judgment
far more faithful to the expansive designs of the architects of Section 7.161
F.

Applying Meyers II to Parexel

Meyers II, while broader in tone than Meyers I, is narrow enough to be simply and
reflexively applied. Thus, in Parexel, because the discharged worker acted alone, was not
engaged in union activity, did not intend to induce group activity, was not acting as a
representative of at least one other worker, and was not asserting rights rooted in a collective
bargaining agreement, Judge Amchan would not find that an NLRA violation had been
committed. The NLRB’s subsequent reversal of the judge, an outcome with which I agree, was
in my view not sufficiently persuasive to withstand appellate scrutiny. The retaliatory conduct
previously found violative of the Act, and to which the NLRB analogized, was not in fact
analogous, as I will explain in the next Part.
III.

BEYOND KNEEJERK MEYERS II

In my view Parexel has set the stage for the NLRB to revisit Meyers II. An obvious
complaints relating to safety statutes are distinguishable from other individual complaints, can be reconciled with
the language of section 7 except by reliance on one or both of the rationales the majority identifies as underlying the
Alleluia doctrine.”)
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preemptive strike by an employer to prevent the possibility of discussions between workers is
unlawful for the same reason that the preemptive strike of a worker complaining to a government
employment enforcement agency should be found unlawful: it squelches pre-organizational
worker activity. Concerted activity is extinguished before it can begin. No Supreme Court
precedent would preclude such an interpretation of Section 7.162 In this part, I first explore, in
subpart A, the Parexel majority’s theories for reversing Judge Amchan’s decision. I reject the
theories, because they are a poor fit to Parexel’s facts. In subpart B, I explore a different
rationale in support of Parexel’s outcome.
A.

The Majority's Theories in Support of Finding a Violation

To its credit, the Parexel majority refused to engage in a kneejerk Meyers II analysis. I
applaud because it seems very difficult to accept that employers are at liberty to discharge
workers to prevent them from exercising statutory rights in the future. Conceptually, however, it
is not so simple to provide a coherent justification for reinstating the involved discharged
worker.163 The majority understandably reached out for situations in which the Board and courts
had found violations in various nip-in-the-bud scenarios. Regrettably, in my view, each of the
scenarios selected provide insufficient doctrinal justification for affording the discharged worker
in Parexel statutory protection.
The Parexel majority analogized the discharge of individual workers to prevent future
protected concerted activity to refusals to hire union-affiliated workers.164 Indeed, this was the
only theory with the benefit of case support in the main body of the decision. Under the famous
Phelps Dodge case, 165 decided by the Supreme Court in 1941, it is unlawful to refuse to hire a
worker because of a known or suspected affiliation with a union. 166 The Court’s Phelps Dodge
argument was that attempts by employers to exclude union-affiliated job applicants acted as “a
dam to self-organization at the source of supply” of union labor. 167 Parexel’s majority
analogized, “[t]he Respondent sought to erect ‘a dam at the source of supply’ of potential,
protected activity.”168 But the entire Phelps Dodge analysis presumes unionization, 169 and the
case therefore supplies a predicate of concert that is simply not present in Parexel.170
The Board also cited one of its cases from the 1980s, Monarch Water,171 as authority. 172 But
in Monarch the evidence showed that the employer had at least a suspicion of prior concerted
activity. 173 There was no such evidence in Parexel.174 While the Parexel majority may have
162
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thought the cases sufficiently parallel because in each actual concerted activity was absent,175 the
employer's belief of the existence of concerted activity in Monarch deals a death’s blow to the
analogy.
As I have discussed above,176 the Parexel majority also cited Compuware Corp. 177 to support
its decision. 178 But the discharged non-union worker in Compuware had made it known to
several of his co-workers that he intended to complain to state officials about terms and
conditions of employment. Compuware is probably the cited case most similar to Parexel, both
because it arose in a non-union context and because the employer discharged a worker to
interfere with the future exercise of what would have been concerted activity. 179 But the “would
have been” was preceded by actual concerted activity of which the employer had been aware. In
the words of presiding Administrative Law Judge Rose,
I further conclude, however, that Schillinger had been engaged in concerted
activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, and he was terminated because of a
perception that he might continue to do so by expressing concerns of employees at
a meeting to be attended by representatives of the State of Michigan. I conclude
that Schillinger was not terminated so much for what he did as what Mutter and
Hess believed he might do if he continued as an employee.180
Thus, Compuware is a “suspicion” case in a way that Parexel is not. One might say that the
employer’s suspicion in Compuware was grounded in the common sense notion that earlier
known concerted activity may not have ceased. In Parexel any suspicion the employer might
have harbored respecting future concerted activity was purely a product of its imagination, not of
reasonable inference.
Another union-context theory might have been raised by the Parexel Board, and I explore it
here to illustrate what I think was wrong generally about Parexel’s “spirit” of analysis, and how
the error of the method could be unwittingly exacerbated. Under the long-established Darlington
Manufacturing doctrine an employer may lawfully close its business where the avowed motive
of the closure is anti-union discrimination. 181 But this rule, which can be surprising to those
unfamiliar with labor law,182 is not without limits. It might be found that a multi-facility or
multi-departmental employer closed only a portion of its business with the “purpose or effect” of
chilling remaining workers in other facilities or departments in the exercise of their Section 7
175
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rights. In such a case, a violation of the NLRA can be made out, 183 and under the George
Lithograph line of authority that is true whether or not the remaining workers had any future
intention of engaging in union or protected concerted activity. 184
It would be tempting to ignore the union context of Darlington and George Lithograph and
to fixate on the fact that anti-union conduct chilling workers who may themselves have engaged
in no union or concerted activity is nevertheless unlawful. But the anti-union conduct is
unlawful because the employer’s inferred motive is to suppress union activity. Moreover, a
violation is made out only after establishment of antecedent unlawful activity. So the violation is
in a sense derivative, which is, again, not factually similar to Parexel.
In sum, Parexel’s undergirding theories, while intuitively satisfying — or even seemingly
obvious — are seriously vulnerable to sustained scrutiny. Nevertheless, as I explain in the next
subpart, the outcome in Parexel is justifiable.
B. An Alternative Rationale – Protecting the Right to Engage in Concerted Activities for Other
Mutual Aid or Protection
The thrashing resort by Parexel to union-context, nip-in-the-bud actions is understandable.
The Meyers cases, which are actually quite distinct, have left an indelible impression and act as a
brake on expansive readings of Section 7. But there are two reasons that the NLRB should not
be so quick to deny protection to individual workers protesting their working conditions. First,
the legislative history shows that Congress had expansive intentions when enacting Section 7 and
adopting the term “concerted activities.” It is hard to conceive that reasonably broad applications
of the provision would have been repugnant to the then-existing congressional intent. 185
Obviously, considerations of congressional mood points are secondary to statutory language,
especially while textualists dominate the courts.186 Thus, I place particular emphasis on a second
fundamental reason for extending Section 7 protections in these situations. As Professor Morris
observed in the 1980s, Section 7 protects the right of workers to engage in concerted activities as
well as their actual engagement in such activities.187 Employers can invade this right by directly
183
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interfering with workers’ actual concerted activities undertaken for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection. But protection of the right to engage in concerted activities introduces a degree of
ambiguity to the matter that I think has been severely underappreciated by both the NLRB and
the circuit courts. Surely protection of actual concerted activities from adverse employer actions
as the sole means of protecting the right to engage in concerted activities is not the only
permissible reading of section 7. Parexel presents the textbook case of the inadequacy of such
an interpretation. For if an employer discharges a worker whom it believes may engage in such
concerted activities, before any such concerted activities have taken place, the employer has
obviously interfered with the right of the worker to engage in the activities.
To be sure, any discharge interferes with the attainment of any right to which a worker may
have become entitled by virtue of continued employment. But Parexel represents the pure case
in which the facts established that the employer’s purpose in discharging a worker was to prevent
future exercise of protected concerted rights in a non-union context. This cannot be acceptable
and does not follow from the language or history of Section 7. In the penetrating words of
Professors Gorman and Finkin,
. . . the narrow reading of the Act proceeds upon a false dichotomy, for at the
core of the freedom of the individual to protest in a group necessarily lies the
freedom of the individual to protest at all. Merely because Congress, for
historically explicable reasons, chose in framing section 7 to emphasize out of
that continuum of individual activity only the controversial aspect of combination
is no reason to read the noncontroversial, lesser included activity out of
the Act's “omnibus guaranty of freedom.”188
Those of us who have spent time in the world of work know that workers in a cowed workplace
will not exercise Section 7 rights.189 A nation in which workers can be summarily fired simply
for advancing statutory employment claims is a nation in which workers’ awareness, let alone
exercise of, NLRA rights will be curtailed severely. That is obviously a world that some find
attractive — how else does one (rationally) explain the trenchant opposition by employer groups
to requiring employers to post notices in the workplace merely informing workers of their
Section 7 rights, including, one might mention, the right not to belong to a labor organization or
to engage in protected concerted activities?190 To the statutory point, the conduct in question
interferes with the right to engage in protected concerted activity.
As Professor Morris cogently observed, it is precisely at the pre-organizational stage of
worker activity that the potential and desire for worker organization is most hazy. 191 Justice
Brennan made note of this in City Disposal, 192 as Professor Morris also recognized. 193
188
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Longstanding law has irregularly taken notice of this fragility, albeit at times in oblique terms.
One good example of this recognition is the rule forbidding employer maintenance of rules
reasonably tending to interfere with, coerce, or restrain workers in the exercise of Section 7
rights.194 It is unnecessary (and probably impossible) to prove there has been actual unlawful
impact on those rights.195 It is enough that the rules are overly broad and could be interpreted as
doing so.196 Thus a violation of Section 8(a)(1) can be found in the utter absence of concerted
activity. Moreover, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by discharging a worker because of a
violation of the overly broad rule.197 What is the policy undergirding this NLRB rule? It is
plainly pre-organizational protection of Section 7 rights. We will never know whether workers
might have exercised Section 7 rights if there are employer rules that will nip the exercise in the
bud. In several areas, the policy of the law has not waited for actual interference with concerted
activity, especially in worker communication contexts covered by the NLRA, even if modern
courts are not always up to the task of remembering this.198
In the next section I explain how an expanded view of concerted activity could impact
“employment law as labor law” strategies.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING TO EMPLOYMENT LAW AS LABOR
LAW

As I mentioned in the introduction to this essay, interest exists among some scholars in the
utilization of employment law in a way previously thought reserved to labor law. I will not
repeat here my surface objections to this approach. But from what has preceded I suspect my
line of thinking respecting the continued viability of a labor law centered approach to nascent
protest activity has revealed itself. If an individual worker’s complaint to a government
employment enforcement agency could find shelter in the NLRA, the act of resistance might
have the opportunity to ripen into full-fledged concerted activity. That is, it might experience a
transformation from pre-organizational to actual organizational activity. 199 Expressed in
negative terms, swift, crushing retaliation against such a worker might be avoided or remedied
thereby reducing the “interference, restraint, or coercion” that Section 7 is meant to guard
against.
Even the mere investigation of such a claim could have beneficial effects. As things stand
[W]hat emerges from the general background of §7— and what is consistent with the Act's
statement of purpose — is a congressional intent to create an equality in bargaining power
between the employee and the employer throughout the entire process of labor organizing,
collective bargaining, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.
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now, the NLRB would dismiss reflexively a charge that in essence alleged a common claim of
the type rejected by the Meyers cases. When I was a regional office NLRB agent investigating
such charges — and I saw a number of them — it seemed that only those allegations reflecting
concerted activity in the most obvious sense survived more than two or three weeks on my desk.
But when one combines Parexel with the original Alleluia presumption the potential for a
dramatically different NLRB investigative culture emerges. For Parexel says, at the most
practical level, “wait.” In the investigation underlying Parexel, the Regional Director waited
long enough to discover the discharge of a worker whom the facts strongly suggested might have
engaged in concerted activity. To be sure, the investigation might have revealed in a convincing
sense that the worker had affirmatively disavowed any intention of talking to co-workers about
the underlying dispute. But because the facts did not suggest anything of the kind, the Region
kept faith with its statutory mission and caused an administrative complaint to issue. On
reflection, the regional reflex in Parexel evinces an instinct akin to what the Alleluia Board
originally proposed decades ago. With respect to discharges undertaken in apparent retaliation
for seeking the aid of government enforcement agencies, the NLRB of that time said,
[I]t is reasonable to presume that when an individual employee invokes a statute
governing a condition in the workplace he is within the scope of employee action
contemplated by the Act . . . .[I]t would be incongruous with the public policy
embedded in employment-related legislation.. .to assume that, in the absence of
an express manifestation of support, other employees do not collectively share an
interest in an attempted vindication of the statutory right created for their benefit .
. . Making this presumption does not end the matter; it merely shifts the burden to
the employer to show that, in a particular case, the employees, for whatever
reasons, opposed the individual's assertion of that interest or that the individual
specifically acted in his own interest.
Because the action of a worker in invoking such a protective workplace statute so obviously
inures to the benefit of most workers in the workplace — for some it may represent the first
suggestion that they might have any hope of gaining improvements to their working lives — it is
reasonable to presume other workers would support the initiative. And if that presumption is at
least reasonable,200 the NLRB should have all the authority it requires to find that a retaliation
against the claim filing is presumptively interference with the right to engage concerted activities
for mutual aid or protection — unless it finds evidence rebutting the presumption. As a practical
matter, at the level of regional investigation, such a presumption would communicate to regional
personnel, “wait!” — just as they waited in Parexel.
It remains to explain why “the waiting” matters. Suppose additional investigations. Suppose
administrative complaints. Suppose findings of violations and — in our wildest imaginings —
upholding of those violations by circuit courts. Does that not simply bring one right back around
again to the roundly criticized and admittedly unsatisfactory NLRA regime that prompted
exploration of the “employment law as labor law” gambit in the first place? For even assuming
200
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the unsatisfactory state of the employment law architecture, it is not apparent why “the answer”
would be a return to the NLRA.
To address that question I return to my days in the late 1990s as a new NLRB agent. I would
find myself involved in cases in which my region had found violations of the NLRA that did not
involve a monetary remedy. The remedy simply required the offending employers to enter into
settlement agreements to “cease and desist” the unlawful conduct and to post standard “Notices
to Employees.” The employers’ counsel negotiated for days or weeks over the wording of the
notices. Even assuming workers would read the notices, which in my experience is a very large
assumption,201 employers were sometimes willing to go to formal hearings — spending hundreds
or even thousands of dollars in the process — over hypertechnical language disagreements.
Why? Not because the employers had anything to fear about the consequences of later being
found to be in breach of the settlement agreements by monitoring workers. Everyone knows
about the weakness of NLRA remedies,202 and unless the cases involved major union organizing
drives breaches of settlement agreements commonly had very limited repercussions. So — why?
As I have written previously, law signals society’s views respecting labor’s legitimacy. 203
For example, after enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 and Section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933, a wave of union organizing involving millions of
workers commenced. This wave was premised on contentions that “President Roosevelt”
wanted workers to join unions. 204
Countless Unions were aroused overnight from the doldrums of depression
lethargy. Confident in the protection of the law, organizers set out to restore the
depleted strength of moribund locals, for new ones, and invade territory from
which they had formerly been barred.205
The organizers were wrong about the assumed protections, which would not exist in any
affirmative way — as weak as the protections ultimately were — until the passage of the Wagner
Act in 1935. But the organizers believed they had rights. And those they were organizing
believed they had rights. And it is my simple contention that no one would have litigated
Alleluia Cushion all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court for any purpose other than to extirpate
the possibility that workers may once again believe they have rights.
The waiting matters because it is worthwhile to reflect — at least for a moment — on the
question of whether the stamping out of a lone complaining worker may represent an attack on
the right of all workers to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid or protection. For this
is an exercise of allowing labor law — the only body of law explaining to workers by virtue of
its very existence that there is indeed safety (and power) in numbers — to fulfill its function.
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CONCLUSION
In Parexel the “Obama Board” made a good start at recovering from the self-inflicted
institutional trauma represented by the Meyers decisions. The agency dared to see the obvious:
an employer firing a sole worker out of a feverish belief that the worker might talk to other
workers about workplace unfairness preemptively strikes at the right of all workers to engage in
protected concerted activity. Employers may discharge individual workers complaining to
government enforcement agencies in order to interfere with, coerce, and restrain other workers in
the exercise of Section 7 rights. Given the weakness of the employment law regime, it would not
be unreasonable for the NLRB to presume — pending a full administrative investigation — that
that is precisely what is going on. A slumbering formality holding to the contrary defies both
common sense and workplace reality. Once that formality is interrogated and exposed a flood of
disinfecting sunlight may yet uncover all stratagems meant to thwart the design of Section 7.
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